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Employment Discrimination
by Richard L.Ruth'
The 1996 survey period presented a rather unique year for the
Eleventh Circuit in the employment discrimination arena.1 For
example, the long anticipated wave of Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") litigation finally reached shore. In a different twist, employers
fared better than in past years on summary judgment appeals. Finally,
the first reported retaliation case in the Eleventh Circuit arising under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") was decided.
In all, as the following discussion will amply illustrate, it was a very
busy year for employment law in the Eleventh Circuit, with significantly
more noteworthy cases on appeal.
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A.

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
1. Disparate Treatment Cases.

In Mayfield v.Patterson Pump

Co.,' the court analyzed a typical race disparate treatment case. In that

* Attorney with the law firm of Corbin & Duvall, Jacksonville, Florida. Milwaukee
School of Engineering (B.S., with honors, 1992); Stetson University College of Law (J.D.,
cum laude, 1994). Member, The Florida Bar.
1. This Article will cover significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during the calendar
year 1996. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are included: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1988)); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") §§ 2-15 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1988)); the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, and scattered section (Supp. 1992)); the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") §§ 1-108 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12117
(Supp. 1992)); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988)); and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
2. 101 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1996).

1527

1528

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

case, an employee brought a Title VII race discrimination action against
his former employer, alleging that his employer terminated him as a
result of racial animus. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of defendant-employer, and plaintiff appealed.'
On appeal, defendant did not dispute that plaintiff could establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. However, defendant did
contend that plaintiff was terminated for legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons. In particular, defendant alleged that plaintiff was terminated
because of an unexcused absence, lying about his whereabouts on that
unexcused absence, approving for shipment to customers a nonconforming product, and failing to complete an assigned job. As a result of these
workplace infractions, defendant contended that termination was
appropriate. Plaintiff, on the other hand, produced evidence of isolated
incidents in which racial epithets were used by co-employees and one of
defendant's supervisors. However, none of these racial incidents and
epithets were connected with the supervisor who terminated plaintiff.
In fact, at his deposition, plaintiff expressly stated that the supervisor
"who terminated him was not racist and did not evaluate him on the
basis of race. 4
In light of the evidence introduced at the summary judgment stage,
the court concluded that defendant met its burden to produce legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment actions taken against
plaintiff.' Furthermore, the court held that plaintiff wholly failed to
offer evidence to establish that defendant's explanation for plaintiff's
discharge was a pretext for discrimination, and plaintiff himself refuted
any suggestion that the supervisor's terminating him was motivated by
race.' For those reasons, the court held that the district court properly
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the
judgment of the district court.7
In Trotter v. Board of Trustees,8 the court was called upon to examine
racial discrimination in an unequal salary context. In that case,
plaintiffs had been employed in a hospital maintained by defendant.
Plaintiffs were both African-American. Subsequently, a white individual
was hired in the unit at a much higher salary than plaintiffs, even
though he had less experience than plaintiffs. When plaintiffs complained to the hospital about the salary disparity, the hospital investi-

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1372-75.
Id at 1375.
Id. at 1376-77.
Id. at 1378.
91 F.3d 1449 (11th Cir. 1996).

1997]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1529

gated and found that the white individual's salary was in error, and that
he should not have been given a higher salary than plaintiffs.9
Nonetheless, before the hospital concluded its investigation, plaintiffs
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). After acknowledging its error, the hospital offered to pay
plaintiffs the difference between their salaries and the white individual's
salary, but plaintiffs refused the offer. Nevertheless, after a new
compensation system was implemented, the hospital paid plaintiffs a
lump sum equal to the difference between their salary and the white
The plaintiffs eventually brought suit against
individual's salary'
defendant in the United States District Court, alleging sex and race
discrimination in violation of Title VII, Section 1981, and the Equal Pay
Act. Only plaintiffs' race discrimination claim was tried before a jury.
"At the conclusion of the evidence, but before the case was given to the
jury for deliberation, the district court granted the [defendant's] motion
as a matter of law," and plaintiffs then appealed that
for judgment
11
ruling.
On appeal, plaintiffs first contended that they presented direct
evidence of discrimination which precluded summary judgment for
defendant. They had indeed presented evidence that a head nurse in
their unit had once explained to a doctor that she had left the emergency
room, where she had worked as a nurse, because she did not like taking
orders from an African-American person.'" Furthermore, plaintiffs
alleged that on another occasion the head nurse attempted to discharge
a patient who was causing problems for a white employee.' 8 However,
despite this evidence, the court noted that the head nurse was not
involved in the challenged salary decision, and thus any statements of
discriminatory intent attributable to her could not constitute direct
evidence of discrimination. 4 In fact, the court noted that a new
individual had taken over the head nursing duties in plaintiffs' unit,
while the head nurse in question was preparing to set up another unit
in the hospital.'" Moreover, the court noted that the prospective salary
of the white employee was discussed only with the human resources
specialist at the hospital, and not with any head nurse. 6 Therefore,

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 1451.
Id. at 1452.
Id
Id. at 1452-53.
Id.
I& at 1453-54.
Id. at 1454.
Id.
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the court concluded that there was no direct evidence of discriminatory
intent that demonstrated the salary decision was racially motivated.1"
The court proceeded to analyze plaintiffs' case under a circumstantial
evidence framework."8 The court noted that defendant did not argue
that plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie case of racial discrimination.19 Therefore, the court directly proceeded to address "whether the
[defendant] had satisfied its burden to produce evidence to rebut that
presumption. ' In this regard, the defendant presented extensive
testimony establishing that the white employee was paid a higher salary
purely by mistake, due in part to the inexperience of the human resource
specialist issuing the salary, and the workload of the human resources
department at the time.2 Indeed, the court took note of a conversation
between the human resource specialist and the white employee in which
the white employee stated he would not work for less than the disputed
salary amount.2" Furthermore, the court noted with significance that
the human resources specialist did not even know the race of the
plaintiffs when making the challenged salary decision.'
The court then proceeded to address whether plaintiffs met their
ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
salary decision was motivated by intentional discrimination." In this
regard, the court concluded that there was simply no evidence presented
by plaintiffs that any decisionmaker at the hospital connected with the
salary decision at issue was motivated by racial animus, and thus held
that plaintiffs did not carry their ultimate burden of persuasion.' For
those reasons, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.26
In Pritchard v. Southern Co. Services,27 the court reviewed the

district court's entrance of summary judgment for the defendantemployer on a Title VII gender discrimination claim. In that case,
plaintiff was an electrical engineer hired by defendant to perform
nuclear engineering work. Plaintiff suffered from severe depression
related to the nuclear work, and her doctor stated that while she could
work, she could not do so in the nuclear field. However, the employer

17. Id.
18.

Id. at 1454-58.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1455.
Id.
Id. at 1456.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1457.
Id. at 1457-58.
Id. at 1458.
92 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir.), amended by 102 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 1996).
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did not transfer her, contending that all of its engineers needed to have
the flexibility to perform nuclear-related work and that it would have
been her responsibility to apply for any nonengineering job. In addition
to her primary claim under the ADA, plaintiff also brought a secondary
Title VII gender discrimination claim against her employer. In essence,
plaintiff presented evidence that she had heard of a male employee who
she believed was transferred to a non-nuclear position, unlike plaintiff.
However, she did not know for certain why he had been transferred, but
she surmised it was related to the stress of nuclear work." Moreover,
all of her information about that employee came from conversations with
co-workers.
In rejecting plaintiff's Title VII gender discrimination claim, the court
noted that all of plaintiff's statements in her deposition used to support
her response to defendant's motion for summary judgment constituted
inadmissible hearsay,
Because plaintiff presented absolutely no
conflicting evidence that could be reduced to admissible form at trial, she
failed to demonstrate that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason for
discharge was pretextual, and the court affirmed the district court's
entrance of summary judgment for the employer on plaintiff's Title VII
gender discrimination claim. 1
In Harris v. Shelby County Board of Education,3 2 the Eleventh
Circuit analyzed, in part, an employee's race discrimination claim
against a defendant school board. In that case, plaintiff applied for
principalship at a high school and alleged that the defendant discriminated against him by failing to select him for that principalship because
of his race. Plaintiff brought suit, in part under Title VII, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, back pay, and other employment
benefits. Subsequently, the district court entered summary judgment in
favor of defendant, and plaintiff appealed."
On appeal, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor
of defendant on plaintiff's Title VII claim. 4 The court noted that
plaintiff had presented evidence to support his allegation that the
decisionmaker in this case intentionally discriminated against him
because of his race." On the other hand, the court also noted that the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

92 F.3d at 1131-35.
Id.
1& at 1135.
Id.
99 F.3d 1078 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1080-81.
Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1081.
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person who was hired for the principalship in place of plaintiff was much
more qualified than plaintiff.36 The district court had found that
although the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of race
discrimination, he failed to offer sufficient evidence that the legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for the defendant's hiring of the replacement
were merely a pretext for discrimination, in light of the replacement's
qualifications."7 The court concluded that from the facts presented on
the summary judgment record, it was clear that the other individual's
qualifications were sufficiently superior to those of plaintiff and that no
juror could reasonably conclude that defendant would not have made the
same decision absent discriminatory intent.' However, the court noted
that such a defense, that the defendant would have made the same
hiring decision even in the absence of any discriminatory intent, did not
constitute a complete avoidance of liability under Title VII because of the
changes brought by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The court, after
analyzing the evidence, found sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent
to raise genuine issues of material fact.' Consequently, as to plaintiff's
Title VII claims, the court vacated the district court's entrance of
summary judgment in favor of defendant and remanded the case for
further proceedings on the Title VII claim.4'
In Forehand v. Florida State Hospital,2 a number of AfricanAmerican state hospital employees brought a Title VII race discrimination suit against their defendant-employer. The original plaintiff in the
eventual class action alleged that the defendant discriminated against
her in a promotion decision when the job at issue was given to a white
woman. The original plaintiff later "amended her EEOC complaint to
state that the discrimination against her was part of a pattern and
practice of racially discriminatory recruitment, hiring, job assignments,
promotions, demotions, terminations, lay-offs, reprimands, seniority, and
affirmative action programs at the Hospital.
Although the EEOC
concluded that the hospital's decision to promote the other candidate
selected was based on nondiscriminatory criteria, the original plaintiff
still filed a Title VII employment discrimination action against her
employer. Later, she was joined by twelve additional plaintiffs who were
all initially certified into a plaintiff class. In a subsequent bench trial

36. Id at 1085.

37. Id. at 1083-84.
38. Id. at 1085.

39. Id. at 1084-85.
40. Id at 1084.
41. Id at 1085.
42. 89 F.3d 1562 (11th Cir. 1996).
43. Id at 1564-65.
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before a special master, statistical evidence was presented to support
plaintiffs' pattern and practice claim of racial discrimination, and
defendant offered statistical evidence to refute that claim as well. After
the bench trial, in his report, the special master adopted defendant's
statistical evidence in lieu of plaintiffs' statistical evidence, and the
district court agreed with those findings. Thus, plaintiffs appealed that
decision.'
On appeal, the court noted that "the statistical evidence in this case
was used to determine whether there existed a disparity between the
percentage of black employees eligible for promotion and the percentage
Defendant's "statistical evidence showed no
of blacks promoted."
pattern and practice of discrimination ...

while the [plaintiffs']

statistical evidence showed some evidence of such a pattern and practice,
i.e., the percentage of blacks eligible for promotion exceeded the
The court explained that this
percentage actually promoted."
disparity between the parties' statistical conclusions arose from the
unique promotion decision-making process at defendant hospital.47
Over the ten-year period at issue in this case, seventy-five percent of
"promotions" came from a process that was noncompetitive. Noncompetitive promotions did not require an application and selection
process, but rather, were often merely an administrative reclassification of jobs which involved some increase in pay. By contrast, twentyfive percent of promotions resulted from a process that was competitive. These promotions required an application and selection process.
The percentage of blacks who applied for competitive promotions was
greater than the percentage of blacks in the Hospital's workforce in
general.'
In analyzing the issue, the court stated that "[ildeally, to determine
whether there existed a disparity between the percentage of eligible
blacks and those promoted,

...

the percentage of blacks seeking

competitive promotions [should be compared] to the percentage
competitively promoted and, independently, compare the percentage of
blacks in the workforce to the percentage granted noncompetitive
promotions. 49 While the court noted that defendant "did, in fact,
undertake such [] analysis and found approximate parity in the
percentages, [nleither party placed primary reliance on [such a]

44. Id. at 1565-73.

45. Id. at 1572.
46. Id
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.
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methodology."5 Instead, the court noted that both parties "attempted
to compare the percentage of all black employees promoted (including
both competitive and noncompetitive promotions) to the percentage in
the pool from which promotions were granted.""l Furthermore, the
court recognized that "the parties disagreed [I on the data [that would]
be used as the benchmark, i.e., the pool from which promotions were
granted. [Plaintiffs] chose as their pool the percentage of blacks who
applied for competitive promotions," or an "applicant flow" benchmark.52 "To this applicant flow benchmark, [plaintiffs] compared the
percentage of blacks in the 'at issue' jobs, i.e., the percentage granted
both competitive and noncompetitive promotions."" The court reasoned
that this methodology drastically skewed plaintiffs' results." The court
stated that "[blecause the percentage of blacks was greater in the
applicant pool than in the Hospital workforce, the applicant flow
benchmark would tend to overstate any underrepresentation of blacks
in the 'at issue' jobs." 5
By contrast, the court noted that defendant hospital "chose as its
benchmark the percentage of black employees within each job category
at the Hospital," or a "workforce" benchmark."6 "By use of the workforce benchmark, the Hospital compared the percentage of blacks in the
workforce to the percentage of blacks granted both competitive and
noncompetitive promotions."'
Yet, the court noted, "[blecause the
percentage of blacks in the Hospital workforce was less than the
percentage of black applicants for competitive jobs, the workforce
benchmark potentially understated discrimination with respect to
competitive promotions."' Thus, the court reasoned that "the workforce benchmark also skewed the statistical results, although not as
badly as did the applicant flow benchmark because ...seventy-five
percent of promotions were non-competitive."59
In summary, the court concluded that "both [plaintiffs'] applicant flow
benchmark and [defendants'] workforce benchmark skewed the results
of their statistical analyses: the applicant flow benchmark overstated
any disparity while the workforce benchmark understated any dispari-

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1573.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ty."° Nonetheless, the court determined that because "seventy-five
percent of promotions were non-competitive, the distorting effect of the
[plaintiffs'] applicant flow benchmark was much greater than the
distorting effect of the [defendants'] workforce benchmark." Thus, the
court affirmed the judgment of the district court with respect to
plaintiffs' pattern and practice race discrimination claim, holding that
it was not clearly erroneous for the special master and district court to
reject the applicant flow benchmark. 2
In Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea,' the Eleventh Circuit paid visit to a case
that it had previously addressed in 1990." Plaintiff was fired by
defendant-employer, a county health department. Thereafter, she
brought Title VII and Section 1983 claims against defendant for race
discrimination, for national origin discrimination, and for violation of her
due process rights. The district court initially ruled for defendants on
all claims, and plaintiff appealed. The Eleventh Circuit, in its earlier
decision, reversed and remanded, holding that the "'discriminatory
circumstances presented in the case demanded a retrial and reexamination of all issues."' On remand, plaintiff tried her Section
1983 claim before a jury; afterward, the Title VII claim was tried before
the district court judge. Although the judge found for defendants on the
Title VII claim, the jury found for' plaintiff on the Section 1983 due
process claim and awarded punitive damages. The court later ordered
that one dollar in nominal damages be added to the Section 1983 verdict.
After the trial, defendants appealed on several grounds, and plaintiff
cross-appealed, raising various issues.6
As to her Title VII claim, plaintiff argued "that the District Court
improperly discounted her direct evidence of discrimination. 7 Plaintiff
testified at trial that one of the decisionmakers as to her employment
told her that he wanted a black person in plaintiff's job.6 However,
"the district court did not credit this testimony for two reasons: (1) the
[decisionmaker] denied the allegation, and (2) the allegation was absent
from [plaintiff's] charge of discrimination filed with the [EEOC]. 9
Holding that the district court was in the best position to evaluate the

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
71 F.3d 837 (11th Cir. 1996).
Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1990).
71 F.3d at 840 (quoting Caban-Wheeler, 904 F.3d at 1558).
Id.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 843.
Id.
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credibility of the witnesses, the Eleventh Circuit felt compelled to
conclude that the district court's decision not to credit plaintiff's
testimony about the decisionmaker was not clearly erroneous. 0 Thus,
because "that was the only direct evidence of discrimination" proffered
by plaintiff, the court ruled that "the District Court did not err in not
shifting the burden of proof to the defendants to show that the same
decision would have been made in the absence of discrimination."
Plaintiff also argued on appeal that the district court did not comply
with the court's decision resulting from the first appeal in the case.
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly
addressed in its findings of fact each of the issues raised in the first
appeal.73 The court stated that "just because the court ruled against
[plaintiff] after considering those issues does not mean that it violated
[the Eleventh Circuit's prior] mandate."74
Finally, as to plaintiff's Title VII claim, plaintiff argued "that the
District Court was bound by any determinations the jury made when
deciding the Section 1983 claim, and that the court did not properly
abide by the jury findings when deciding" against her on the Title VII
claim.75 "Specifically, [plaintiff] argue[d that the jury awarded
punitive damages for her procedural due process claim, and so must
have found malicious intent," thereby supporting her Title VII claim.76
However, the court, while noting that "the judge in this case, when
deciding the Title VII claim, was bound by the jury's findings on the
Section 1983 due process claims," found that "the judge's findings on the
Title VII claim did not directly conflict with the jury's findings on the
procedural due process claim."77 Indeed, the court determined that "the
jury may have found that the defendants acted recklessly in regard to
[plaintiff's] procedural due process rights, but did not intentionally
discriminate based on her race, sex, or national origin" in violation of
Title VII.78 Thus, the court held that a favorable jury verdict in
plaintiff's favor under Section 1983 did not compel a judge's verdict in
plaintiff's favor under Title VII. 9

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 843-44.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
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In Jameson v. Arrow Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit was faced, in part,
with race discrimination issues arising out of a reduction in force
("RIF"). Plaintiff was terminated by defendant employer, as part of a
reduction in force. After plaintiff's termination, defendant hired a black
woman as human resources trainee, an entry-level position for which
plaintiff was fully qualified. Plaintiff, after filing a charge of race
discrimination with the EEOC, brought suit against defendant contending that it discriminated against her on the basis of race by expressly
directing that a black female be hired to assume the entry-level job for
which plaintiff was qualified at the time of her discharge. The district
court, on defendant's motion for sunmary judgment, found that although
plaintiff established a prima facie case of race discrimination, she failed
to show that defendant's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for not hiring her for the position were pretextual. Thus, the district
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's
race discrimination claim, and plaintiff appealed."'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's entrance
of summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's race discrimination claim. 2 Specifically, the court noted that "the explanations
[given by defendant, and] relied on by the district court were based upon
underlying issues of material fact that remained in dispute, and that the
court not only improperly weighed the evidence submitted by each party,
but also credited one version of events in granting summary judgment.' First, the district court relied on defendant's explanation that
it "had no consistent policy of transferring employees who had been
terminated.' s However, a former employee relations manager for
defendant testified that defendant had "'mov[ed] people around' during
the RIF, and had transferred at least one plant manager to a personnel
position." 8 Second, the district court credited defendant's explanation
in support of its motion that it "had a policy of not transferring workers
into positions that effectively would be demotions .... " Yet plaintiff
had presented evidence that even though defendant "posited that the
entry level position for which [the black woman] was hired would have
been a demotion, [the] director of Human Resources [for defendant]
stated that this position was created to 'grow and develop into a position

80. 75 F.3d 1528 (11th Cir. 1996).
81. Id. at 1530-31.
82. Id, at 1534.
83. Id. at 1533.

84. Id.
85. Id. (brackets in original).
86. Id.
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of increased responsibility.'" 7 Finally, plaintiff and defendant disputed
where the position was to be geographically located. Thus, in contrast
to the district court, the appellate court concluded that the evidence
presented by plaintiff was "more than merely speculative, and thus she
had satisfied her burden to produce sufficient evidence from which a
rational inference of... race discrimination could be drawn.*8s The
court noted that although "a trier of fact could infer that there was no
intent to discriminate" against plaintiff, a jury could also infer that
defendant "deliberately refused to transfer or rehire [plaintiff] for jobs
for which she was qualified at the time of her discharge because of her
... race."8 9 Consequently, the court held that it remained "the
province of the finder of fact to decide which inference should be drawn,"
and that "[tihe district court expanded its review of the record evidence
beyond that which was permitted at the summary judgment stage.' °
Therefore, the district court's entrance of summary judgment in favor of
defendant on plaintiff's race discrimination claim was reversed, and the
case was remanded for further proceedings.91
2. Sexual Harassment. In Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Management, Inc.,' the court analyzed corporate liability for hostile work
environment sexual harassment. Defendant managed pizza restaurants
and plaintiffs were employees at one of the restaurants subject to the
management contract. Plaintiffs claimed that they were sexually
harassed by a pizza delivery driver working for the restaurant and
asserted that they complained of this harassment to the manager of the
restaurant. Subsequently, plaintiffs left a message with defendant's
vice-president. After receiving that notice, defendant began an
immediate investigation of the alleged sexual harassment and failed to
find any support for the allegations. Notably, plaintiffs had all
voluntarily resigned and refused to meet with defendant's officials
during the investigation."
After plaintiffs filed suit, the district court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment." In affirming the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendant, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that defendant could be indirectly liable under Title VII for the co-

87. Id. at 1533-34.
88. Id. at 1534.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
93 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 753-54.
Id at 753.
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employee's alleged misconduct only if it failed to take prompt remedial
action after receiving notice of the alleged harassment." In this case,
the court agreed that plaintiffs' first complaint to the manager of the
restaurant did not constitute a complaint to higher management in light
of the chain of hierarchy that existed within defendant's organization,
Furthermore, the court noted that the evidence showed that defendant
took prompt remedial action after receiving notice of plaintiffs' alleged
sexual harassment.' Consequently, the court held that defendant was
Furthernot liable for the alleged misconduct of the co-employee.
more, the court also ruled that plaintiffs' constructive discharge claims
were properly dismissed because constructive discharge would generally
not be found if the employer is not given sufficient time to remedy the
situation." Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision
to grant summary judgment for defendant on all claims.'0°
In Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc.,"' the court was called upon once again
to analyze corporate liability for sexual harassment committed by frontline supervisors and co-employees. In that case, plaintiffs allegedly were
subjected to extensive sexual harassment by defendant-restaurant's
supervisors and co-employees, including sexual advances and being
shown sexually explicit videotapes and photographs. Defendant did not
contest that the environment in which each plaintiff worked was hostile
by Title VII standards, but instead contended that whatever environment existed, it could not be held liable for damages because it took
immediate action after higher management became aware of the hostile
situation. After trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs
on their hostile environment claims and defendant-employer appealed. 0 2
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
The
court pertaining to defendant's hostile environment liability."
court noted that "[tihe hostile environment in this case was so pervasive,
and managers at the restaurant were so inextricably intertwined in this
environment, that higher management could be deemed by a jury to
have constructive knowledge" of the hostile environment.'" 4 The court

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 754.
Id.
I&
Id.
Id. at 755.
97 F.3d 488 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490.
Id.
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expressly stated that the evidence of harassment was "extremely
extensive, and that so many employees were involved indicate[d] that
the events at [the restaurant] were not cloaked in secrecy."'
Therefore, the court held that "the district court's conclusion that the evidence
was enough to show that [defendant's] higher management had
constructive knowledge was not error."l') Furthermore, the court
explained that defendant could not complain about its lack of notice at
the time the hostile environment existed because a "reasonable jury
could have found that the [defendant's] sexual harassment policy was
never communicated to Plaintiffs.""° In fact, plaintiffs had alleged
that there was no sexual harassment policy posted to provide plaintiffs
with guidance on how to contact upper-level managers when a sexual
harassment situation existed.1'8
However, on appeal, defendant-employer preserved at least a minor
victory. Despite finding defendant liable for the existence of a hostile
environment, the court concluded that the employer did not act with
malice or recklessness necessary to be liable for punitive damages."°
The court noted that the record failed to show that any "member of the
[defendant's] management higher up the corporate hierarchy than the
harassing employees themselves acted with [a] state of mind" of malice
or recklessness." 0 Thus, the court expressed that the defendant's
"mere constructive knowledge of the harassment could not support
punitive damages."' As a rule, the court stated that the definitions
of malice and recklessness, to impute punitive damages to a defendant,
"do not reach an employer with only constructive knowledge, at least
when that constructive knowledge flows from negligence, as opposed to
willful blindness."" In this case, the court ruled that "no evidence
showed [that defendant] failed to become aware of the hostile environment because of any established policy of willful blindness."" Rather,
the court noted that defendant "had a general policy against sexual
harassment and did investigate the complaints it received."" 4 Finally,
the court "decline[d] to hold that... the state of mind of the harassing
employees count[ed] as the state of mind of [the defendant] employer for

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 491.
Id.
IdId.
I&
Id.
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punitive damages purposes.""" Consequently, the court affirmed the
district court's entrance of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on
the issue of liability for the hostile environment, but reversed the district
court's grant of punitive damages against defendant-employer." 6
B.

Proceduraland Evidentiary Matters

1. Summary Judgment Procedure. In Vining v. Runyon," the
Eleventh Circuit was called upon to review the propriety of the district
court's grant of summary judgment to defendant in a Title VII racial
discrimination and retaliation case. In that case, plaintiff had "moved
to compel the production of the personnel records of four white former
co-workers who, like himself, had either absence or tardiness probSubsequently, after defendant had moved for summary
lems.""'
judgment, plaintiff "again moved to compel the production of [those
records], and also requested the production of his own personnel file.
The district court ordered that all of these personnel files be produced
for an in camera review . . ., noting that the files 'were important for
purposes of comparison to [plaintiff's] case.'"" Yet "[a]fter reviewing
the evidence contained in these files, the district court granted [defendant's] motion for summary judgment and subsequently denied
[plaintiff's] motion to compel as moot."' 2 In fact, "[in its order
granting summary judgment, the district court noted that the decision
was made 'after reviewing [the] evidence [contained in the personnel
files], and considering the briefs filed by the parties.'' 2 ' Moreover, the
district court found that plaintiff was not similarly situated to white
referencing personnel records subject
employees who had been retained,
2
to the in camera inspection.'
On appeal, the court held that it was improper for the judge to rely on
the in camera submission when ruling on defendant's motion for
summary judgment.' Rather, the court held that

[a]lthough a judge freely may use in camera, ex parte examination of
evidence to prevent the discovery or use of evidence, consideration of

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 489.
99 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 1996).
I at 1057.
Id.

Id.
121. Id. (brackets in original).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1058.
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in camera submissions to determine the merits of litigation is allowable
only when the submissions involved compelling national security
concerns or the statute granting the cause of action specifically
provides for in camera resolution of the dispute.'
Because neither of those two exceptions applied to the instant case, the
court concluded that the district court erred in using the information
obtained from the in camera examination of the personnel files.'25
Further, the court held that it was error for the district court to decide
the summary judgment motion before ruling on an outstanding motion
to compel.'2" Thus, the district court's order granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded
by the court for reconsideration
of the summary judgment issue and the
27
motion to compel.
2. Class Actions. In Forehand v. Florida State Hospital,"s the
Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue regarding a district court's decision
to decertify a discrimination class ten years after the Title VII race
discrimination case was filed. In that case, the original plaintiff had
filed a Title VII employment discrimination action in 1983. In the final
complaint, plaintiff was joined by twelve additional plaintiffs. 12 Thus,
in 1985, the district court certified the plaintiff class. In 1986, a bench
trial was held before a special master. Almost four years later, the
special master recommended that the district court enter judgment in
favor of defendants. Two years after that, the district court entered
judgment in favor of defendants and held, in part, that the class had
been improperly certified and, therefore, decertified the class. After this
ruling, plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to decertify the
class ten years after the case was filed. 30
On appeal, the plaintiffs "urge[d] that the district court's decertification decision was especially inappropriate because the case was filed ten
years earlier and had already gone to trial."'' Yet the court noted
that "[a] district court may alter or amend a certification order any time
before its decision on the merits."13 2 Although the court noted that "a
class decertification order entered ten years after commencement of the
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126.
127.
128.
129.
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131.
132.
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action is unusual and perhaps disfavored,' the court found no abuse of
Rather, the court
discretion by the district court in this case.'
concluded that the district court's reasoning that the class failed to
conform to applicable legal requirements was correct and supported by
the record.'" Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the district
court's reasoning and affirmed the order decertifying the class.'
3. Sanctions. In Turner v. Sungard Business Systems, Inc.," the
court addressed an interesting issue regarding sanctions under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, plaintiff brought
a racial discrimination action against his employer under Title VII.
and
Plaintiff had alleged that the employer denied him a promotion
37
employee.
white
a
with
position
vacant
the
filled
instead
Subsequent to the filing of the action, plaintiff's original counsel
withdrew from the case. Eventually, substitute counsel fied a notice of
appearance in the action and continued to prosecute plaintiff's action.
Later, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff
neither responded to the motion nor appeared at oral argument. Thus,
the district court granted the employer's summary judgment motion on
the ground that plaintiff had made out no prima facie case of race
discrimination."S
After prevailing on its motion for summary judgment, defendantemployer then moved for sanctions. The district court awarded sanctions
against plaintiff and the substitute counsel for prosecuting a frivolous
action, but did not award sanctions against the original counsel, finding
that the original counsel had made some investigation of plaintiff's claim
and withdrew when he learned that plaintiff's claim was meritless.
Plaintiff and plaintiff's substitute counsel appealed the district court's
order on several grounds." 9
First, plaintiff's substitute counsel argued that it signed no document,
such as a pleading or motion, sufficient to invoke Rule 11. Rather,
substitute counsel argued that the only paper he signed and submitted
to the court was a notice of appearance, which alone could not subject
him to sanctions under Rule 11."4 However, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected such an argument, finding that Rule 11 applies to all papers,

133.

Id.

134. Id. at 1566-67.
135. Id.
136.

91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).

137. Id. at 1420.
138. Id.
139.
140.

Id. at 1420-21.
Id. at 1421.
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including notices of appearance, filed in a suit. 141 In fact, the court
expressly noted that "[bly appearing in the case, [substitute counsel]
affirmed to the court that the case had arguable merit."' In essence,
the court 1explained, it was as if substitute counsel had refiled the
complaint. 4
Second, plaintiff and his substitute counsel argued that because
sanctions were not imposed on the original counsel, they could not be
imposed on plaintiff and his substitute counsel. "In essence, appellants
argued that because the complaint was not sufficiently frivolous to
subject [the original counsel] to sanctions, [appellants] could not be
subject to sanctions."'
However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this
argument as well, finding that substitute counsel knew from the moment
he began representing plaintiff that his claim was meritless.'" Thus,
the court concluded "[t]hat [merely because] the contentions contained
in the complaint were not frivolous at the time it was filed [did] not
prevent the district court from sanctioning [plaintiff and his substitute
counsel] for continued advocacy of them after it should have been clear
that those contentions were no longer tenable."'
Consequently, the
court found that the lower court's award of sanctions against plaintiff
and plaintiff's counsel was proper. 47
4. Pre-suit Arbitration. In Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container
Corp., 4 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the doctrine of excusable
neglect in the context of arbitration prior to a discrimination suit. In
that case, plaintiff brought an employment discrimination action against
defendant-employer. The district court referred the case to pre-suit
arbitration. The arbitration panel found in favor of defendant-employer,
but through miscommunication, plaintiff's attorneys did not file a
request for trial de novo within thirty days as required by the district
court's local rules. Consequently, the clerk of the district court entered
judgment for defendant in accordance with the arbitration panel's
decision. Plaintiff
then appealed the district court's denial to set aside
1 49
the judgment.
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On appeal, the court analyzed whether plaintiff's counsel's failure to
file a request for trial de novo was due to excusable neglect. In
consideration of the issue, the court noted that the lack of prejudice to
defendant-employer was key.'" The court noted that plaintiff filed a
request for trial de novo only six days late, and the defendant produced
no evidence to indicate that it was "lulled or otherwise prejudiced by the
untimely filing. " 151 Rather, the evidence showed that settlement
discussions and discovery continued because "both parties expected to
continue litigating regardless of the arbitration panel's decision.""5 2
Therefore, the untimely filing of a request for trial de novo was ruled to
be a result of excusable neglect, the district court's entrance ofjudgment
in favor of the employer was overturned, and the case was remanded for
further litigation.'"
5. Releases. In Puentes v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,' the
Eleventh Circuit examined issues pertaining to knowing and voluntary
waivers of employment discrimination claims through releases in
exchange for severance packages. In that case, plaintiffs were terminated from their employment with defendant and at the time of the
terminations "were offered substantial severance packages and the
ability to 'resign for personal reasons.'"'" However, these packages
and the resignation characterization were only available on the condition
that plaintiffs "execute unambiguous releases waiving all employment
discrimination claims arising out of their terminations. Both plaintiffs
However, "[tihereafter, the plainagreed to execute the releases."'
alleging that they were
[defendant]
tiffs filed this lawsuit against
discrimination 'on the
of
employment
as
a
result
unlawfully terminated
of
[defendant-employer's]
basis of national origin and/or race,' as part
ongoing pattern of terminating management-level Hispanic employees
Defendant moved for
and replacing them with non-Hispanics.""'
summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs' claims were barred because
they had knowingly and voluntarily executed the releases concerning
such employment discrimination claims.'" The district court granted

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id
86 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1996).
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the employer's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs appealed
that order.1
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was a
"question of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs were given
adequate time to review the releases before executing them.""s As a
preliminary matter, the court noted that the waiver of employment
discrimination remedial rights must be closely scrutinized.""1 Therefore, the court stated that when "determining whether a release was
knowingly and voluntarily executed, courts look to the totality of the
circumstances," including "plaintiff's education and business experience;
the amount of time the plaintiff considered the agreement before signing
it;... plaintiff's opportunity to consult with an attorney; the employer's
encouragement or discouragement of consultation with an attorney; and
the consideration given in exchange for the waiver."'
In this case, plaintiffs' principal assertions concerning the releases
were that "they were not given adequate time to consider the agreement,
and that they were not given a fair opportunity to consult an attorney."'
Plaintiffs contended that they were only given twenty-four
hours to decide whether to sign the releases and that they understood
that the offer would not be valid longer than that. The court concluded
that "absent some reason for urgency, twenty-four hours is too short a
period" of time."' Moreover, the court noted that it was "undisputed
that neither plaintiff consulted- with an attorney before'signing the
releases, and a twenty-four hour time limitation ... substantially
impeded their ability to do so."'
The court also significantly noted that "plaintiffs had no role in
deciding the terms of the releases[, as] [nione of the terms of the
release[s] were negotiated.""
Rather, the court recognized that
plaintiffs were simply handed a printed form."17 The court also '
expressed concern that one plaintiff "requested to take a copy of the
release form home overnight to think about it, and was told that he
could not take the form out of the [employer's] office, because it was [the
employer's] document and [I property." ' The court admonished that
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"there is no good reason why [the employer] could not have provided [the
employee] a copy of the release form that it was asking him to voluntarily and knowingly sign."'" The court concluded that the employer's
refusal to provide a copy of the release, "like a twenty-four hour time
constraint, could have been motivated by a desire to impede the
[plaintiffs'] ability to consult with an attorney."'"0 Consequently, the
court held that a reasonable fact finder could have found that plaintiffs
did not knowingly and voluntarily execute the releases, and accordingly,
the issue could not be resolved by summary judgment. 7 ' Thus, the
and the case was remanded
judgment of the district court was reversed,
72
for further litigation proceedings.
6. Administrative Prerequisites to Suit. In Forehandv. Florida
State Hospital,178 the court analyzed the concept of a right-to-sue letter
as a jurisdictional or statutory prerequisite to suit and analyzed the
doctrine of equitable modification. In that case, as discussed earlier in
this Article, plaintiffs all found themselves decertified from an original
class action. Some of the class plaintiffs had failed to satisfy all
conditions precedent to suit themselves or relied on the original
plaintiff's charge under the single filing rule. The district court found
that the nonfiling plaintiffs' claims were so different from the original
plaintiff's promotion claim that they could not be permitted to rely on
the original plaintiff's charge of discrimination. In addition, the district
court held that certain plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administracourt and, thus,
tive remedies before commencing suit in federal
174
dismissed their claims. Plaintiffs then appealed.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that certain plaintiffs filed suit
before receiving their right-to-sue letters from the EEOC. 175 Therefore,
those plaintiffs were required to depend upon the doctrine of equitable
modification to support their claim. The district court had held that
these plaintiffs "were not entitled to [I equitable modification because
they filed suit and requested their notice of their right to sue long before
the 180-day statutory period had elapsed." 78 The district court had
also found it significant that the EEOC only issued the letters after
plaintiffs' attorneys sent a specific request to the EEOC requesting a

169. Id.
170. Id.
171.

Id. at 199-200.
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right-to-sue letter. The district court reasoned that these plaintiffs
"deliberately frustrated the EEOC investigation and conciliation process
by requesting their right-to-sue letters prior to the expiration of the 180day period.' 77
Relying on previous cases, the court held "that receipt of a right-to-sue
letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but rather, is a
statutory precondition which is subject to equitable modification."'
On the one hand, the court concluded "that there is no per se rule that
receipt of a right-to-sue letter during pendency of the suit always
satisfies the exhaustion requirement."17 Thus, the court agreed "with
the district court's general proposition that if a claimant attempts to
frustrate investigation or conciliation by the EEOC, equitable modification of the exhaustion rule may be inappropriate."'" In fact, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that "the district court properly applied this rule
to [one plaintiff whose] failure to cooperate with the EEOC disentitled
her to equitable modification," in light of the fact that the EEOC
Nonetheless, with
dismissed her claim for such lack of cooperation.'
respect to the other applicable plaintiffs, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed
with the district court, in part due to intervening case law. 2 The
court noted that "the EEOC regulations expressly contemplate that a
plaintiff may make an early request for a right-to-sue letter, and that
the EEOC may issue the letter upon determining that it is probable that
it will be unable to complete its administrative processing within the
180-day [conciliation] period.""s Thus, the court held that "[a] plaintiff
should be free to make an early request for a right-to-sue letter upon the
assumption that the EEOC will perform as contemplated in the
regulations by issuing the letter only if it is probable that it will be
unable to complete the administrative processing within 180 days."'
Thus, being "uncertain as to whether the district court would have
reached the same finding in light of the intervening case law," the
Eleventh Circuit vacated for further proceedings on the issue of
equitable modification.'"

177. Id.
178. Id. at 1569-70.
179. Id. at 1570.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. See Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1995); Sims v. Trus Joist
MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1994).
183. Forehand, 89 F.3d at 1570.
184. Id. at 1571.
185. Id

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1997]

II.

1549

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
In Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., s the court
was faced with a typical age discrimination discharge case arising under
the ADEA. In that case, plaintiff, who was sixty years old, was a
manager with defendant-newspaper company. Subsequently, plaintiff's
newspaper company merged with another newspaper organization and
consolidation of managers in the geographic area was conducted. An
interview procedure for various candidates was implemented, and that
procedure was not favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that his
interview lasted only a half-hour, whereas the candidate who was finally
selected for retention was given a full hour, as all of the interviews were
originally planned to be. Furthermore, plaintiff alleged the atmosphere
of his interview was cold, and the supervisor with decision-making
authority was on the phone most of the time. Last, but not least,
plaintiff pointed to his sales experience at his old newspaper as
illustrating his credentials for the position." 7
Defendant, on the other hand, contended that the candidate selected,
even though much younger than plaintiff, was much better qualified and
suited for the new job than plaintiff. Defendant further contended that
all of plaintiff's successes were in the field of sales and not management.
Furthermore, defendant pointed to plaintiff's earlier evaluations,
evidencing the fact that plaintiff was not a team player. The district
court eventually granted defendant-employer's motion for judgment as
a matter of law, and plaintiff appealed." s
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first analyzed whether plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of age discrimination.'" The court
noted that in this merger situation, this case did not fit neatly into a
failure to hire mold or a reduction in force mold.19' Rather, instead of
strictly resorting to a concrete prima facie case test, the court chose to
"examine the facts of the case and decide 'whether the plaintiff has
presented sufficient evidence to provide a basis for an inference that age
was a factor in the employment decision. ' "' Under such a standard,
A.

186. 97 F.3d 436 (lth Cir. 1996).
187. Id at 438.
188. Id. at 438-44.
189. Id. at 439.
190. Id. at 440.
191. Id. (quoting Pace v. Southern Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383,1387 (11th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Pace v. Southern Ry., 464 U.S. 1018 (1983)).
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the court concluded that plaintiff presented a prima facie case.'" The
court stated that plaintiff was in a protected age group and was
adversely affected by the merging employer's decision to select another
candidate who was sixteen years younger than plaintiff.1"' Finally, the
court noted that plaintiff was at some level qualified for the new
position.'" Thus, the court concluded that plaintiff had sufficiently
established a prima facie case of age discrimination.'
The court's next inquiry was whether the defendant-employer had
"met its burden of producing evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for offering the job to [the other candidate] rather than to
[plaintiff]." " ' In this regard, the court held that the employer did
indeed meet "its burden... by asserting that [plaintiff] was denied the
managerial position because he was the less qualified of two applicants
for the same job.""9 Therefore, "having met its burden of production,
[the ultimate burden) fell to plaintiff to show that the employer's
proffered reason for the adverse employment decision was false and that
discrimination was the real reason."198
In this regard, the court held that plaintiff's "efforts to produce a basis
to contradict [the defendant's] non-discriminatory justification [for the
employment action did] not suffice to create a jury question on the issue
of pretext."'
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that
none of the evidence produced by plaintiff provided a basis for contradicting defendant's ultimate justification for the employment decision-that the other candidate was more qualified.' °
Therefore,
because plaintiff failed to present any evidence to overcome defendant's
ultimate reasons for selecting the other applicant, the court affirmed the
judgment of the district court in favor of the employer."1
However, despite being a routine age discrimination case, the decision
contained an exhaustive analysis regarding the effects of the St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks2 2 decision on discrimination cases. In fact, the
court noted a conflict in the case law of the Eleventh Circuit on this
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issue, comparing Howard v. BP Oil Co.' 3 to Walker v. NationsBank' and Batey v. Stone.'06 On this issue, the court stated that
it "believe[dl that Howard [was] mistaken when it read [ Hicks as
controlling kinds of cases that were not before the Supreme Court in
Hicks.'
The court stated that "Hicks only held that a judge may,
after bench trial, disbelieve the employer's proffered reason for a hiring
However,
decision and yet still grant judgment to the employer."
the court had "no confidence that the Hicks decision dictat[ed] to ...
judges ... that every time the evidentiary record ... could support a
jury's disbelief of the employer's explanation for the [ employment
action, no court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law to
the employer in an employment discrimination case." °s Rather, the
court opined that "Hicks, taken as a whole, more likely support[ed] a
different conclusion: in such circumstances, the watchword would be not
'every time,' but 'sometimes."'
Thus, the court concluded that
a
more
correct statement of the law in
not
Howard,
was
NationsBank,
2
1
Nevertheless, the court concluded that
the Eleventh Circuit.
whatever significance Howard might have had in the circuit, that
decision did not control the instant case because examination of the
record indicated that plaintiff "failed in creating an issue of fact about
the disbelievability of the [defendant] employer's reasons for the hiring
decision." 1 '
In Jameson v. Arrow Co.,21 the Eleventh Circuit once again analyzed an age discrimination claim in the context of a reduction in force
("RIF"). In that case, plaintiff was a white female over the age of fifty
employed by defendant at one of its plants. Thereafter, defendant
implemented a significant RIF, and plaintiff was discharged. Defendant
subsequently hired another individual, a twenty-three-year-old woman,
as a human resources trainee, which was an entry-level position for
which plaintiff was fully qualified.'
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging, in
part, that "her termination, coupled with [defendant's] failure to transfer
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or rehire her and its decision to hire" another individual for a position
for which she was qualified, "constituted [unlawful] age... discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act."214
After a lawsuit was filed, "[tihe district court concluded that [plaintiff]
had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because
she had not presented evidence by which a fact finder could infer that
[defendant's] failure to transfer or rehire her was motivated by
discriminatory animus based upon her age." 1 Plaintiff then appealed
the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant on her age discrimination claim.1 6
On appeal, plaintiff did "not dispute that the initial termination and
consequent elimination of her position resulted from a legitimate RIF,
but argue[d] that [defendant's] failure to transfer her or rehire her for
numerous positions available at the time of her termination constitute[d]
evidence of discriminatory intent.2 17 Plaintiff "emphasize[d] that she
specifically expressed to her supervisor her interest in the position of
personnel administrator-later filled by a younger woman-but was
informed that [defendant] did not plan to fill this position."
Plaintiff
further argued "that the facts that [defendant] transferred one younger
employee from [her department] and hired several younger individuals
for other positions for which she was qualified are evidence that the
impermissible factor motivating defendant's decisions [concerning
plaintiffs
was] to replace older female workers with younger employ219
ees."

In analyzing the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations in the summary
judgment context, the court noted "the basic proposition that, when an
employer reduces its workforce for economic reasons, it incurs no duty
to transfer laid-off employees to other positions within the company. 2 ° However, on the other hand, the court also noted its reasoning
from earlier cases suggesting that "where a job for which the plaintiff is
qualified, and for which a plaintiff applies, is available at the time of
termination, and the employer offers the job to an individual outside the
protected age group, an inference of intentional discrimination is
permissible."22' The court took great pains to
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emphasize that the ADEA does not mandate that employers establish
an interdepartmental transfer program during the course of an [sic]
RIF, require that "younger employees be fired so that employees in the
protected age group can be hired," or impose any added burden on
employers to transfer or rehire laid-off workers in a protected age
group as a matter of course. 2

Rather, the court held "that a discharged employee who applies for a job
for which she is qualified and which is available at the time of her
termination must be considered for that job along with all other
candidates, and cannot be denied the position based upon her age."2'
In this regard, the court held that
[a]n employer's decision to transfer or to hire a younger employee for
that available position is sufficient evidence to support an inference of

discrimination for the limited purpose of establishing the plaintiff's
prima facie case; the employer then may rebut this inference by
providing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision which
the plaintiff, in order to avoid summary judgment, must show to be

pretextual.

N

With this analysis in mind, the court concluded that, although the
defendant "incurred no absolute duty to hire [plaintiff] into any of [the
available] positions, its failure to do so, coupled with its decision to
employ younger workers during its RIF, could give rise to a rebuttable
inference that it intended to discriminate against [plaintiff] on the basis
The court therefore concluded "that the district court erred
of age."
in its finding that [plaintiff] failed to make out a prima facie case of age
discrimination, and thus improperly granted summary judgment [for
defendant] on this basis."2 '
B. ProceduralMatters
1. Class Actions. In Armstrong u. Martin Marietta Corp.,' the
court was required to rule on a matter of first impression involving
options that age discrimination plaintiffs, "who have been dismissed
from class actions after opting-in to the class actions, [have] to protect
their right to litigate their claims individually before the statute of
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limitations runs."22 In this case, a number of employees joined
together to file an age discrimination action under the ADEA against
defendant-employer. Subsequent to the filing of the action, the district
court dismissed certain employees' claims without prejudice, concluding
that they were not similarly situated to the class action plaintiffs.o
A few months later, the employees whose claims had been dismissed
from the class action filed their own ADEA class action against
defendant-employer. However, this action had been filed well after the
ninety-day period following the district court's order of dismissal.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment
against most of those plaintiffs on the ground that plaintiffs failed to file
their individual lawsuits within ninety days after receiving notice of
their dismissal from the original class action. The district court granted
the motion for summary judgment.2'
On appeal, "plaintiffs contend[ed] that the ninety-day filing period for
bringing an ADEA action in district court remained tolled after their
dismissal from the class action because the district court did not enter
a final judgment."2 3' Alternatively, the plaintiffs contended that the
Eleventh Circuit "should excuse their failure to file their individual
lawsuits within the filing period because they did not receive notice that
the ninety-day filing period resumed upon their dismissal from the class
action." 2
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue as to whether "the
ninety-day statute of limitations of the ADEA... remains tolled when
the district court dismisses claimants from the pending class action in
an interlocutory order."2 In this regard, the court noted that neither
the Eleventh Circuit, nor any other circuit, had previously addressed
Indeed, the court expressed that this issue was "of
this issue.'
particular importance because at the time of the dismissal claimants
cannot appeal the district court's dismissal order as of right because it
is not a final judgment.""5
In deciding this issue, the court noted that "[iun the context of class
actions, the 'interlocutory' status of the dismissal order does not negate
the fact that the claimants lose their membership in the class ac-
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230.
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233.
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235.
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may only be tempo-

rary because the district court may reconsider its dismissal order and
vacate the order, or upon final judgment the claimants may appeal their
dismissal and the appellate court may reverse the district court's
decision."' 7 In light of these facts, the court gave three options for
plaintiffs who have been dismissed from age discrimination class
actions.' Plaintiffs may:
(1)within the remaining time before the statute of limitation runs, file
an individual lawsuit thereby rendering any appeal of the dismissal
from the class action moot; or (2) await final judgment in the class
action, appeal from that final judgment, and if not successful file an
individual lawsuit within the time that remained at the time of their
dismissal; or (3) before the running of the statute of limitations, move
for an interlocutory appeal. If the district court certifies the issue for
interlocutory appeal, an interlocutory appeal is taken, and the district
court is affirmed, tolling of the running of the statute of limitation
ceases and the claimant may file an individual lawsuit before the
statute of limitations runs. If the district court declines to certify the

issue for appeal or an interlocutory appeal is not taken, the claimant
may file an individual lawsuit within the time remaining or exercise
option 2 and await final judgment.2 8
The court felt that this holding promoted economies of justice and
avoided needless multiplicity of actions." °
Unfortunately, had the court applied this new rule of law to this case,
plaintiffs' actions would have been barred because they filed a lawsuit
well outside of the ninety-day window.241 Because the court, prior to
its holding in this case, was silent on this issue, the court concluded that
plaintiffs could continue their individual lawsuits in the case, but could
not appeal the dismissal order or the final judgment in the original class
action.24 2 Accordingly, the district court's conclusion of law that
plaintiffs' ADEA lawsuits were barred was reversed, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings. 2

236. Id. at 1509.
237. Id.
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In Grayson v. K Mart Corp.,' the Eleventh Circuit became extensively involved in sophisticated employment discrimination class action
litigation gone haywire. In that case, issues were raised regarding two
groups of plaintiffs involved in overlapping age discrimination class
actions. All plaintiffs were store managers with defendant-corporation
and were demoted or terminated by defendant during a period from 1990
to 1992. "Plaintiffs alleged that their demotions or terminations were
motivated by age-discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act." 45 The first class action, aptly named the
Grayson action, was commenced in January 1992. A second action,
called the Helton action, was commenced in October 1992 before a
different district court judge, but in the same district of the federal
court. Thereafter, plaintiffs in both cases engaged in parallel discovery.
In February 1993, defendant-employer "moved for severance in the
Helton case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), arguing that
the claims of the five plaintiffs in Helton were not properly joined under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20."" In March 1993, defendant filed
a similar motion in the Grayson case. In September 1993, the judge in
the Helton case rejected defendant's motion for severance. Nonetheless,
in February 1994, the judge in Grayson granted such motion. In
February 1994, plaintiffs in Helton filed a motion seeking leave to
amend their complaint to allege for the first time an ADEA class action
and a motion for leave to amend their complaint to add that the action
was brought on behalf of other similarly situated individuals.247 In
July 1994, the judge granted plaintiffs' motions in Helton to create an
opt-in class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and to amend their complaint.' s
In August 1994, the judge in Grayson "issued a conditional order
dismissing without prejudice each of the six severed actions remaining
in the Grayson case... not[ing] that all of the Grayson plaintiffs were
members of the Helton class, and assum[ing] that those plaintiffs would
wish to opt-in to the Helton case." 49 In fact, as a condition to these
dismissals, the judge "provided that the six Grayson plaintiffs could
reopen their cases if they were later excluded from the Helton case."
An interlocutory appeal by defendant followed.251

244. 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Helton v. Kmart Corp., 117 S. Ct.
435, cert. denied sub nom. Kmart Corp v. Helton, 117 S. Ct. 447 (1996).
245. 79 F.3d at 1090.
246. Id. at 1092.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1093.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the propriety of the two
judges' actions in Grayson and Helton. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the section 216(b) "similarly situated" requirement was less
stringent than that for joinder under Rule 20(a) or for separate trials
under Rule 42(b).252 As a consequence, the court concluded that the
judge in the Helton case "acted within his discretion in allowing a
[section] 216(b) opt-in class ... because the plaintiffs ha[d] made
substantial allegations and provided evidentiary support for their
contention that they were victims of an age-motivated purge [by the
defendant-employer] from 1990 to 1992."2" In this regard, the court
was persuaded by the evidence presented to the judge that plaintiffs had
met the similarly situated requirement of section 216(b). 2' Moreover,
the court held that the judge in Helton was not required to conduct a
formal evidentiary hearing prior to making his section 216(b) ruling.5 5
However, the Eleventh Circuit paid close attention to the temporal
scope of the opt-in class.2" In defining the scope, the judge in Helton
allowed putative plaintiffs to "piggyback" onto the original Grayson
plaintiff's 1991 EEOC charge.257 The Eleventh Circuit, in analyzing
the propriety of that decision, held as an initial matter that piggybacking was available in ADEA cases and that an age discrimination
plaintiff could piggyback provided that the appropriate legal requirements were satisfied. 2' The court reasoned that "the principle behind
the piggybacking rule [was] to give effect to the remedial purposes of the
ADEA, and to not exclude otherwise suitable plaintiffs from an ADEA
class action simply because they ha[d] not performed the 'useless act of
filing a charge."' 9 However, the court held that the Grayson charge
was particularly inadequate as a representative charge for piggybacking
purposes. 2 " First, the court noted that plaintiff "Grayson's own action
[was] time-barred because he failed to file his written consent to opt into
the Helton class within three years of his demotion."26' Thus, the
court ruled that plaintiff Grayson should have been barred from joining
the Helton class, and his charge should not and could not have served as

252. Id. at 1096.
253. Id. at 1097.
254. Id. at 1099.
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a representative charge for others in the case.'
Second, the court
noted that "even if Grayson's actions were not time-barred, his EEOC
charge provide[d] insufficient notice of the scope of the class."2
Accordingly, the court held that in selecting the representative charge
for the Helton class, the judge should not have selected plaintiff
Grayson's charge, but rather "should have chosen the first timely filed
charge of one of the named plaintiffs that [gave] adequate notice of the
scope of the class."" On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit directed
the judge "to define the Helton class to bar putative plaintiffs who have
failed to file written consents to opt into the class within two years of
their demotions for non-willful violations or within three years of their
demotions for willful violations," citing applicable statute of limitations
requirements.2'
In summary, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
judge's order in the Helton case allowing the creation of an opt-in class
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), yet reversed and remanded the
proceedings so that the judge could modify the temporal scope of the
Helton class consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's opinion.2
2. EEOC Investigatory Authority. In EEOC v. Tire Kingdom,
Inc.,27 the Eleventh Circuit had the opportunity to examine the
powers possessed by the EEOC to conduct an investigation into a former
employee's age discrimination claim despite the fact that the underlying
charge was untimely. In that case, an employee had filed a charge with
the EEOC alleging that defendant-employer had fired him from his
position because of his age. The former employee's charge had allegedly
been fied more than a year after he had been terminated, well outside
the three-hundred day window for the charge to be considered timely.
Nevertheless, the EEOC commenced an investigation and requested from
defendant-employer information necessary to evaluate the allegations of
age discrimination. However, the employer refused to provide the
information requested, citing the untimeliness of the charge. The EEOC
claimed that its authority to investigate claims of age discrimination
existed regardless of the filing of a timely charge. Eventually, the EEOC
was required to issue an administrative subpoena duces tecum and
sought enforcement of the subpoena in the district court. The district

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
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Id. at 1104-05.
Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1108.
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court ordered defendant-employer to comply with the subpoena, and the
employer appealed from that order.2
Thus, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit faced yet another novel
issue-whether the EEOC had the authority to conduct the challenged
investigation in which the underlying charge had been untimely filed.
The court answered in the affirmative, stating that "the ADEA grants
the commission broad power to investigate, and nothing in its language
suggests that this power is dependent upon the filing of an employee's
charge.'
Furthermore, the court noted that the EEOC has an
"independent right to bring suit to enforce the provisions of the ADEA[,
and that an independent investigative authority logically precedes that
right."2 7 Moreover, the court rejected the employer's reliance on the
three-hundred day time limit, stating that the time limit applied only to
cases brought under the ADEA by an individual against his or her
employer, not by the EEOC.271 Thus, the court concluded that "the
Commission's power to conduct an investigation into claims of age
discrimination is not dependent upon the filing of a charge with[in] the
time requirements" specified by the ADEA.272 Therefore, the order of
the district court enforcing the subpoena duces tecum was affirmed.2 78

II1.

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974

In Godfrey v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,274 the court faced
retaliation issues arising under ERISA. In that case, plaintiff submitted
a claim for benefits under defendant's sickness and accident disability
plan. However, defendant's manager denied sickness benefits, and the
review committees denied plaintiff's appeals. Subsequently, defendant
informed plaintiff that she would have to return to work or be discharged. Moreover, because of her sickness, plaintiff's attendance record
was the worst of any employee in her unit, and she was disciplined for
her absences as a result.275 Yet, because plaintiff did return to work,

she did not become eligible for benefits under defendant's long-term
disability plan. Eventually, plaintiff commenced suit in state court,
which defendant later removed to federal court. Thereafter, plaintiff
amended her complaint to add a retaliation claim under ERISA. After
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a bench trial, the district court found that plaintiff was disabled under
the terms of the sickness and disability benefit plan, issued an injunction ordering defendant to comply with ERISA, and ordered defendant
to pay plaintiff a large amount in benefits. Defendant then appealed.'7
On appeal, the court held as an initial matter that "[wihere the
administrator of an ERISA benefits plan has discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits, a court reviews that determination
under the arbitrary and capricious standard."27 7 However, the court
held that "such a determination is not entitled to as much deference
where the administrator has a conflict of interest. 78 In this case, the
court noted that if defendant-employer granted benefits to plaintiff, "it
would have either had to hire a replacement worker or lose the services
of an employee in that position." 9 Thus, the court concluded that
defendant's plan administrators had a conflict of interest.'
Therefore, after reviewing the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the record fully supported the district court's finding that the denial of
benefits to plaintiff was arbitrary and capricious and violated ERISA.2s ' Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court
that defendant-employer unlawfully acted to prevent plaintiff from
obtaining benefits under the sickness and disability plan and from
becoming eligible for benefits under the long-term disability plan.28 2
Consequently, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.2s
IV. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

A.

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
In McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp.,2' the Eleventh Circuit was
presented with the issue of whether plaintiffs suing under the ADA
could recover for discrimination without showing that their disability
was the sole cause of the adverse employment action taken against
them. In that case, plaintiff worked for defendant-newspaper company,

276. Id.
277. Id. at 757-58 (citing Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556,1559 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991)).
278. Id. at 758.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 759.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 761.
284. 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb.
18, 1997) (No. 96-1318).
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the Ocala Star-Banner Corporation. After having brain surgery, plaintiff
began to have problems seeing visual images clearly. Though plaintiff's
vision problems eventually made it difficult, if not impossible, for him to
perform some of his job duties for Star-Banner, for a while, the
newspaper provided assistance with those difficult duties. However,
defendant later ended that assistance when it came to believe that
plaintiff's eye trouble could be corrected with new eyeglasses. Thereafter, plaintiff McNely filed a grievance concerning his working conditions
with the EEOC.m
Eventually, plaintiff's vision difficulties led to a lengthy shutdown of
defendant's printing presses. Plaintiff insisted that the shutdown was
caused by his inability to perform a required job function without
assistance, but defendant contended it was caused by plaintiff's willful
refusal to perform his job. Subsequently, the newspaper reassigned
plaintiff to different job positions, none of which were suitable to
plaintiff given his physical capabilities and skills.'
Later, in a meeting called to discuss the situation, plaintiff lost his
temper with the highest ranking executive at Star-Banner. Plaintiff was
immediately suspended without pay. However, during the suspension,
plaintiff received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC and thereafter
filed a lawsuit against the newspaper alleging violations of the ADA.
After the subsequent trial, the district court gave instructions to the jury
that they could find for plaintiff only if plaintiff had proved that he was
terminated solely because of his alleged disability, or if he had proved
that he was terminated solely because he engaged in statutorily
protected expression. Based on these instructions, the jury returned a
verdict for defendant. On appeal, plaintiff contended that it was error
for the district court to include the term "solely" in its instructions to the
jury, and it was further error for the district court to limit the jury
instruction to the term "terminated."8 7
In support of its argument on appeal, defendant contended that the
provisions of the ADA "impose[d] liability only if the employer [took]
adverse employment action[s] solely because of a reason prohibited by
Conversely, plaintiff contended that the ADA provithe statute."'
sions "imposed liability if a prohibited reason was but one factor in the
employer's decision, so long as the inclusion of that prohibited factor

285. 99 F.3d at 1070.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1071.
288. 1& at 1073. Defendant also asserted that plaintiff had waived its right to object
to the jury verdict form, a contention which the Eleventh Circuit handily dismissed. Id.
at 1072-73.
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After a thorough analysis of
made the difference in the decision."'
the issue, the court agreed with plaintiff and held that the verdict forms
submitted to the jury misstated the liability standard applicable to an
ADA case.Y"
First, the court looked at the statutory language of the ADA itself. 1
The court noted that the liability provisions of the ADA did not contain
the word "solely" or any other similar restrictive term. 2 " Furthermore, the court expressly refused to import use of the term "solely," as
The
contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, into the ADA.Y2
court held2 that such an analogy would be contrary to the ADA's plain
language.
Second, the court looked at the legislative history of the ADA."" In
this regard, the court noted that the House Committee Report concerning the ADA expressly mentioned that the limiting language of the
Rehabilitation Act, namely the term "solely" had been deleted from the
ADA. 2' In fact, the House Committee Report mentioned that a literal
reliance on the phrase "solely by reason of his or her handicap" leads to
absurd results. Thus, the court explained that the explanations the
congressional committees gave concerning the ADA demonstrate that
"Congress knew exactly what it was doing when, by omitting the word
'solely,' it provided a different liability standard under... the ADA than
it provided under the Rehabilitation Act." 9 7
Finally, the court analyzed the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
term "because of' in the context of Title VII cases. 2" Specifically, the
court noted that "when Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, the Supreme
Court had already authoritatively determined that, for Title VII cases,
the term 'because of' did not mean 'solely because of."' " In fact, when
ascertaining congressional intent in enacting the ADA, the court
observed that it did so against the backdrop of Supreme Court case law
interpreting the phrase "because of" under Title VII not to mean "solely
because of."5" For this reason, the court held that "the ADA imposes
289. Id. at 1073.
290. 1& at 1078.
291. Id. at 1073.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1073-74.
294. I. at 1074.
295. Id. at 1074-75.
296. Id. at 1075.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1075-76.
299. Id. at 1075. The Eleventh Circuit was referring to the Supreme Court's analysis
of the "because of" issue in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
300. 99 F.3d at 1076.
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liability whenever the prohibited motivation makes the difference in the
employer's decision, i.e., when it is a 'but-for' cause."30 '
Notably, the court did address ADA cases from other circuits that
However, these other cases
tended to support defendant's position.'
the court felt that its
holding
because
court
in
its
did not sway the
0
the court flatly
"
Indeed,
opinion and holding were well reasoned.
rejected the holding of an on-point case deciding that judgment for an
employer was proper because plaintiff's alleged disability was not the
sole cause of the demotion in question in the case.' Rather, the court
held that such a holding was "contrary to the language of the statute,
the will of Congress, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
substantially identical causal language in the Title VII context."0 5
Similarly, the court held that it was error to limit the jury verdict
The court noted that the ADA
form to the term "termination.'
protects against more than just termination.307 Rather, the court
explained that the ADA prohibited discrimination "'in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.'" 8 Noting that "plaintiff's
complaint alleged a variety of adverse employment actions short of his
ultimate termination," the court concluded that the jury "verdict form
was inconsistent with the ADA, with the complaint, [and] with the
Consequently, the judgment of the
evidence presented at trial."'
district court was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new
trial.3 10
In Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates,31' the court addressed issues
pertaining to whether a plaintiff was a qualified individual with a
disability under the ADA. Plaintiff was employed with defendantmaintenance contractor performing duties that focused on repairing air
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1076-77. Specifically, the court considered Doe v. University of Maryland
Medical Sys., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995);
Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1996); Despears v.
Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995); and White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357
(10th Cir. 1995).
303, 99 F.3d at 1077.
304. Id. (rejecting Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1077-78.
307. Id at 1077.
308. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)).
309. Id. at 1077-78.
310. Id. at 1078.
311. 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996).
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conditioning, heating, and refrigeration systems. While employed with
defendant, plaintiff developed cancer. To undergo testing concerning the
cancer, plaintiff was required to take an extended medical leave of
absence from work.8"
Plaintiff asserted that upon his return to work from that leave of
absence, the terms, conditions, and privileges of his job had changed
substantially. "Specifically, he allege[d] he was no longer assigned to
heating ventilation and air conditioning work but rather was required
to perform general maintenance-type work." 18 Furthermore, plaintiff
complained that he no longer had access to keys that he had possessed
before his leave of absence and no longer had access to company vehicles.
Eventually, plaintiff was terminated after an employment dispute arose
regarding 14workmanship on a particular job to which he had been
assigned.1
Thereafter, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, contending that he
had a disability under the ADA, was regarded by defendant as having
such an impairment, and alleging that defendant discriminated against
him in violation of the ADA. The jury subsequently rendered a verdict
for the plaintiff on his ADA claims, and defendant appealed.315
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment
on the jury verdict. 16 The court specifically held that plaintiff did not
have a disability under the ADA, and accordingly, was not entitled to the
Act's protection.1 In this regard, the court engaged in an exhaustive
analysis regarding what constitutes a substantially limiting impairment
under the ADA.3 8 In reaching its determination, the court relied
heavily upon the language of the Act, as well as the regulations
promulgated by the EEOC interpreting the Act. 19 The court noted the
plaintiff's contentions that the "side effects that he suffered as a result
of his chemotherapy treatments qualified as 'physical impairments'
under the ADA and that these impairments substantially limited his
major life activities of caring for himself and working.'2 ° However,
the court, after considering evidence presented by plaintiff's doctor and
plaintiff himself, found that reasonable persons "could not conclude that
[plaintiff] had a physical or mental impairment that substantially
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319.
320.
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limited his ability to care for himself or to work."' 21 In this light, the
court specifically stated "that the extent, duration, and impact of
[plaintiff's] chemotherapy treatment side effects on his ability to care for
himself and to work reveal[ed] that these side effects [did] not substantially limit his ability" in those aspects.3' Therefore, the court held
that although plaintiff "may have had a 'physical impairment' as it is
defined in the ADA, [it] did not substantially limit his ability to care for
himself or to work" as required to invoke protections under the ADA."
Similarly, the court concluded that the evidence presented at trial was
"insufficient to support a finding that [defendant] regarded [plaintiff] as
having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited his
ability to care for himself or to work."3 4 The court found that the
reassigning of plaintiff's job tasks occurred in response to defendant's
business needs during the busy season for air conditioning repair work
and was not a result of any physical impairment that plaintiff may have
suffered.' 2 Furthermore, the court found that other responsibilities
attendant to the reassigned duties, including those requiring access to
keys and company vehicles, were part of the business duties that had
been reassigned out of business necessity and were not modified in
Consequently, the
response to plaintiff's physical impairment."'
judgment of the district court was reversed, and the matter was
remanded to the district court so that it could enter judgment for
defendant on plaintiff's ADA claims.'"
Pritchard v. Southern Co. Services" involved allegations arising
under the ADA as well as the Title VII gender discrimination issues
previously discussed in Part I(A) of this Article. In that case, plaintiff
contended that her performance of nuclear-related work for defendant
severely exacerbated her depression. Although she requested and
received a transfer by defendant from her electrical engineering job to
the quality assurance department, that work also involved nuclear
energy, and her depression grew worse.329 Eventually, plaintiff was
placed on paid disability leave and subsequently on unpaid disability
leave. Her doctor later stated that she could return to work, but not in

321. Id. at 912.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 913.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 914.
327. Id. at 915.
328. 92 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir.), amended by 102 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 1996), petition for
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 12, 1997) (No. 96-1442).
329. 92 F.3d at 1132.
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the nuclear field. However, defendant did not transfer her to nonnuclear-related work, contending that all of its engineers needed to have
the flexibility to perform such nuclear-related work. To the contrary,
plaintiff contended that certain engineering jobs within the company
required little or no nuclear work, but she was told by the company that
she would be considered only for nonengineering jobs. Nevertheless,
plaintiff was subsequently terminated by the company. After plaintiff
filed suit pursuant, in part, to the ADA, the district court subsequently
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's ADA
claims, and plaintiff appealed.'
On appeal, the court noted that depression had been held by other
courts to constitute a mental impairment."' However, the court also
noted that to constitute a disability under the ADA, the impairment
needed to substantially limit a major life activity of the plaintiff.'
Plaintiff claimed "that her depression substantially limited her ability
to function, sleep, concentrate, and communicate."3ss However, the
district court had reasoned that "in order for [plaintiff] to have been
discriminated against because of her disability, she had to have been
disabled when she was terminated, not at some point in the past."'
The district court concluded that plaintiff's evidence as to impairment
at the time of her termination only showed that she could not work in
The district court stated that "in order for a
the nuclear field.'
[plaintiff's] condition to substantially limit the ability to work, it must
'significantly restrict[]... the ability to perform either a class of jobs or
a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average
person having comparable training, skills and abilities."'' 8
In principal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's legal
conclusion that plaintiff's impairment, by itself, did not constitute a
disability under the ADA because plaintiff's disability only prevented her
from seeking a job in the nuclear field and not as an engineer in
general. 7 Nonetheless, the court found that there was a genuine
issue of material fact concerning whether plaintiff suffered other
symptoms when she was terminated, and as to whether those symptoms

330. Id.
331. Id. See, e.g., Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704
F.2d 1402, 1408 (5th Cir. 1983).
332. 92 F.3d at 1132.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1133.
336. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1991)).
337. Id.
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Indeed,
substantially limited a major life activity of plaintiff,"
plaintiff had presented evidence that at the time of her termination, she
continued to suffer conditions and symptoms related to her depression,
including fatique and difficulty with sleeping and communicating. The
court felt that such "evidence present[ed] a case for a jury to determine
whether she suffered from those symptoms when she was terminated,
and whether those symptoms substantially limited a major life
activity."3 9 Furthermore, the evidence presented established that
plaintiff had a record of being impaired and that the employer regarded
her as being impaired, therefore creating further genuine issues of
material fact as to whether plaintiff stated a claim under the ADA. Yet,
even though the court overruled the district court's entrance of summary
judgment in favor of defendant on the ADA claim, the court explained
that plaintiff still needed to show on remand that she suffered not only
from a disability, but also that she was discriminated against because
of her disability and that she was a qualified individual with a
disability."4
In Harris u. H & W Contracting Co., 4' the court was called upon to
determine what constitutes an "impairment" within the meaning of the
ADA and whether an employee's impairment substantially limited her
major life activities. In Harris, plaintiff suffered from a thyroid
condition. Due to the medication she was taking, her thyroid problems
never seriously interfered with her work or other life activities. In fact,
plaintiff was successfully employed by defendant for a period of time as
its comptroller. Later, plaintiff suffered a panic attack and was
hospitalized for several days. However, there was no dispute that
plaintiff's panic attack had been caused by an overdose of plaintiff's
thyroid medication, and once the dosage was corrected, plaintiff suffered
no more attacks.3' 2
Nonetheless, while plaintiff was on sick leave, defendant hired another
individual to be comptroller. Some time after plaintiff returned to work,
she was informed that she should seek other employment because her
replacement was now in charge. Plaintiff subsequently filed a charge
with the EEOC alleging discrimination and violation of the ADA and
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1134.
340. Id. In so holding, the court also effectively reinstated plaintiffs Rehabilitation Act
claims as well. However, the court later clarified its opinion, holding that individual
officers of the employer were entitled to summary judgment on all claims, as they could not
be individually liable under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Pritchard v. Southern Co.
Servs., 102 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 1996).
341. 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996).

342. Id. at 517-18.
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subsequently brought suit in district court. However, the district court
granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, holding that
plaintiff "could not show that she had a 'disability' within the meaning
of the ADA.'
On appeal, the court reversed the district court, finding that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff had a disability
within the meaning of the ADA." The defendant argued that plaintiff
did not suffer a disability because she had not been substantially limited
Relying
in any of her major life activities by her thyroid problem.'
on interpretive regulations promulgated by the EEOC, the court found
that even though plaintiff controlled her impairment for the most part
through medication, "[tihe determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by
case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medi& Furthermore, the court took judicial notice that plaintiff's
cines. "34
thyroid condition "is capable of substantially limiting major life activities
Therefore, the court was "satisfied
if left untreated by medication."'
that the evidence produced in the case, including [plaintiff's] deposition
testimony and matters subject to judicial notice, [was] sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact about whether [plaintiff's] medical
condition, in the absence of mitigating measures, would substantially
Thus, the court held that "the
limit her major life activities.'
district court erred when it concluded that plaintiff [could] not show she
ha[d] a cognizable disability under the ADA.'& 9
Moreover, the court found that plaintiff established "the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact about whether [defendant] regarded her
as having a substantially limiting impairment, even if she [did] not
actually have one." s° In making this finding, the court relied on
testimony of defendant's president, who had given a statement in
connection with the state labor department investigation to the effect
that he "felt the company was being put in jeopardy, at a disadvantage,
due to [plaintiff's] type illness."' Based on this statement, the court
was persuaded "that a genuine issue of material fact exist[ed] as to
whether [the defendant] decided to permanently replace [plaintiff) as

343.
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346.
347.
348.
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350.

Id.
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Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1996)).
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comptroller because [it] regarded her as having a substantially limiting
impairment."" 2 As a result, the court held that the district court erred
when it granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.'" Consequently, the entry of summary judgment was reversed, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings.'"
In Moses v. American Nonwouens, Inc.," the court established, in
part, the contours of the "direct threat" exemption to the ADA. In that
case, plaintiff suffered from epilepsy, and his job with the defendantemployer required him to sit on a platform above fast-moving machinery
and to sit underneath a conveyor belt with in-running pitch points.3 "
Other duties required plaintiff to work next to exposed machinery that
reached temperatures of 350 degrees Fahrenheit."'7 Defendant, due
to these dangerous circumstances in light of plaintiff's epilepsy,
terminated plaintiff, and plaintiff brought suit alleging violation of the
ADA. The district court entered3 summary judgment in favor of the
employer, and plaintiff appealed. "
In determining the propriety of the district court's entrance of
summary judgment in favor of the employer, the court carefully analyzed
the direct threat exemption to the ADA.'" The court noted that under
this exemption, an employer may terminate a "disabled employee if the
disability renders the employee a 'direct threat' to his own health or
safety."
The court further stated that "the employee retains at all
times the burden of persuading the jury either that he was not a direct
threat, or that reasonable accommodations were available."'
In the
instant case, plaintiff did "not deny that there was a significant risk that
if he had continued working for [defendant], he would have had seizures
on the job."3 " Furthermore, the court noted that plaintiff pointed "to
no probative evidence suggesting that [the defendant-employer] could
have made his worksites safe."'
In this regard, the court held that
defendant-employer's failure to "investigate possible accommodations...
did not relieve plaintiff of his burden of producing probative evidence
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that reasonable accommodations were available.'
Stated another
way, the court held that an employer is not mandated to conduct a
pretermination investigation concerning reasonable accommodation. 3
Consequently, the court concluded that the district court did not err in
granting the employer's motion
for summary judgment under the direct
3
threat exception to the ADA. 6
In Morisky v. Broward County, 7 the court addressed an issue
concerning when knowledge of a disability of a job applicant may be
imputed to the employer for ADA purposes. In that case, plaintiff, an
applicant for a custodian position with defendant, brought an action
under the ADA after defendant denied the applicant's request to have a
pre-employment test read to her. Plaintiff contended that defendant was
aware that she suffered from a disability because on the educational
section of her job application, she indicated that she had not received a
high school diploma and had instead completed special education
courses. Furthermore, at the test, plaintiff allegedly informed the test
proctor, through her vocational rehabilitation counselor, that she was
illiterate and was suffering from bronchial asthma. Yet, at no time did
plaintiff inform anyone employed by the defendant that she had a
mental or developmental disability. Nonetheless, plaintiff maintained
"that her statements at the testing site were sufficient to put [the
defendant-employer] on notice of her disability."38 The district court
subsequently granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
and plaintiff appealed. 9
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
and used as its own opinion the district court's dispositive order, which
was attached to the decision as an appendix."' 0 The Eleventh Circuit,
through the district court's order, affirmed the fact that "[wihile
illiteracy is a serious problem, it does not always follow that someone
who is illiterate is necessarily suffering from a physical or mental
impairment."3 7' Rather, the Eleventh Circuit and the district court
agreed that "[viague or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified
incapacity are not sufficient to put an employer on notice of its
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obligations under the ADA."372 Thus, summary judgment for the
employer was affirmed."7 '
In Mason v. Stallings,74 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of
individual liability under the ADA. In that case, the court confirmed
that the ADA "does not provide for individual liability, only for employer
liability."37 ' This decision was in comport with other circuits addressing the issue. 76 In reaching its holding, the court also utilized other
courts' holdings under the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in
77
analyzing the same individual liability issue arising under the ADA.
B.

Coverage
In Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc.,"' the Eleventh Circuit
faced an interesting scenario involving health insurance coverage of a
former employee under the ADA. In that case, plaintiff was employed
by defendant-restaurant management corporation, who "sponsored and
administered a group welfare benefit plan which provided health
insurance coverage up to a $1 million lifetime limit. 7'8 After plaintiff
was diagnosed with AIDS and defendant learned of his condition when
he submitted health insurance claims for medical treatment, the
employer discharged him to avoid paying future health insurance
claims.'
Following his termination, plaintiff paid the necessary
premiums to continue his health insurance benefit coverage pursuant to
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"). s
Nevertheless, "[alt least partly because of [plaintiff's]
continued participation in the health insurance benefit plan after his
discharge, [defendant] amended the plan ... to cap AIDS-related
treatment to $10,000 annually with a lifetime maximum limit of
Before plaintiff died, he "had exhausted the benefits
$40,000. " '
available to him under the AIDS cap and was denied payment for claims

372. Id.
373. Id. at 446.
374. 82 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1996).
375. Id. at 1009.
376. Id. (citing EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276,1279-82 (7th Cir. 1995)).
377. Id. (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991); Smith v.
Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d
507, 511 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 666 (1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Intl Inc., 991
F.2d 583,587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. LaRosa, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994)).
378. 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996).
379. Id. at 1524.
380. Id.
381. Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (1994).
382. 89 F.3d at 1524.
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submitted in excess, totaling approximately $90,000.",8 The district
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, and plaintiff's legal
representation appealed, contending that he was a qualified individual
with a disability within the meaning of the ADA.'
On appeal, defendant, in support of the district court's decision, argued
that appellant failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under
Title I of the Act, claiming that plaintiff did not satisfy the qualified
individual with a disability ("QID") requirement under the plain
language of the ADA. Appellant, on the other hand, contended that once
plaintiff took advantage of the opportunity to participate in the group
health insurance plan, he was entitled to be provided with health
insurance in a nondiscriminatory manner. In response, defendant
argued that because plaintiff "neither held nor desired to hold a position
with [defendant] at or subsequent to the time the alleged discriminatory
conduct was committed," he did not satisfy the QID requirement.'
After analyzing the issues, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[nleither
the QID definition nor the ADA's definitions of 'employee' and 'discriminate' provided support for Appellant's position.'
In fact, after
reviewing both the ADA and its legislative history, the court reasoned
"that Congress intended to limit the protection of Title I to either
employees performing, or job applicants who apply and can perform, the
essential functions of available jobs which their employers maintain."
Moreover, the court rejected the appellant's arguments and
admonitions to "look to Title VII in seeking to understand ADA
employment terms and [to] conclude that former employees are included
within the scope of ADA protection."'
Rather, the court found "no
clearly expressed legislative intent suggesting that former employees
such as [plaintiff) should be covered under the Act."' s Therefore, the
court concluded that plaintiff, as "a former employee, was not a 'qualified
individual with a disability' as defined under the ADA and [was]
therefore not entitled to the Act's protection."sg Consequently, the
court ruled that the district court appropriately granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss.3 9'
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V. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
In Shealy v. City of Albany,' 9 the Eleventh Circuit became involved
in a decades old civil rights action against the City of Albany. In that
case, the underlying class action was instituted in 1972 pursuant, in
part, to Section 1981, "alleging a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in hiring, promotion, assignment and various other employment
In 1976, the district court had "entered a permanent
practices."'
injunction enjoining the City of Albany from such practices and
mandating equal employment opportunities."3 Decades later in 1994,
a black fire chief promoted a black applicant to the position of battalion
chief within the city's fire department. The five nonselected applicants
were white. These white applicants subsequently "filed a '[miotion of
Prospective Plaintiffs For Intervention,' [seeking] broad relief, including
the dissolution of the 1976 permanent injunction, the setting aside of the
complained of promotion, and the re-opening of the selection process. 95 In a later evidentiary hearing, the fire chief "testified as to
the subjective process he used in selecting the successful applicant for
promotion."3 The district court rejected proffered testimony from the
five unsuccessful applicants regarding the superiority of their qualifications. Nonetheless, the district court indicated that, if subsequently
filed, the court would review their personnel files to determine their
qualifications relevant to the successful applicant. However, approximately two hours later and prior to any such filing or review, the court
ruled that there was no evidence of racial animus in the selection of the
black applicant for promotion. Plaintiffs then appealed.' 9
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's ruling,
having been convinced that there was an abuse of discretion by the
district court.' s The court noted that the "[ilntervenors' attempt to
testify regarding their qualifications and [attempt to] introduce evidence
comparing their qualifications to those of the successful applicant were
cut off by the district court."39 In fact, the court expressly noted that
"[iln refusing the evidence, the district judge made a plea for Fire
Department collegiality," to the effect that everyone within the fire
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department was going to have to work together.' ° The court stated
that while aspirational, that goal was not sufficient reason to deny the
presentation of admissible evidence, and furthermore, was to no avail
because the complaint, having been lodged, already caused inherent and
unavoidable disharmony."' Thus, the court ruled that "[tihe intervenors were effectively denied the opportunity to make out and support a
prima facie case [of race discrimination], by the district court's refusal
to allow them to testify regarding their qualifications, or to review their
personnel files as promised."' 2 Rather, the court held that plaintiffs
must be allowed the opportunity to make out their prima facie case, and
therefore vacated the district court's order and remanded the case. 3
In Goodgame v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,'"4 the court was faced
once again with the tricky issue concerning the retroactivity of changes
made to Section 1981 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In that case,
plaintiffs, who were black, brought suit against their defendantemployer, claiming that they were denied promotions because of their
race. Subsequent to receiving right-to-sue notices from the EEOC, they
filed a lawsuit in district court. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs
were denied a promotion based on their race in violation of Section 1981
and Title VII. Plaintiffs "requested a jury trial with respect to their
Section 1981 claims, but at the time had no right to a jury under Title
VII. During the course of the litigation, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. "4'5 After the effective date of the Act, plaintiffs
-moved to amend their complaint to state claims based on the new
provisions of Section 1981 and Title VII."' The district court held
that "the new provisions retroactively applied to these claims, and
allowed [plaintiffs] to amend their complaint. At trial, the [district]
court submitted [plaintiff's] claims to the jury on special interrogatories
that made no distinction between the Title VII and Section 1981
claims."' 7 The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs.
As to one plaintiff, the verdict did not state whether the award was
based on Section 1981 'or on Title VII. As for the other plaintiff, the
award was presumably under Section 1981 because the trial court had
already granted the defendant-employer judgment as a matter of law on
that plaintiff's Title VII claim. Nonetheless, "[a]fter the trial, but before
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the trial court entered a final judgment, [the Eleventh Circuit] held that
Thus, as
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not apply retroactively.'
of
punitive
the
award
vacated
court
trial
"the
a remedial measure,
would
the
court
that
stating
verdict,
damages and set aside the jury
Rules
the
Federal
of
Rule
39(c)
treat the jury as advisory" pursuant to
4'
to
parties
the
"asked
The district court then
of Civil Procedure.
in
order
submit proposed findings of fact consistent with the jury verdict,
to help it fashion a final judgment compatible with pre-1991 Title VII
and [Section 1981] provisions."
Subsequently, the district court entered judgment for defendant on
every count except for one plaintiff's Title VII claim. As to plaintiffs'
Section 1981 claims, the court granted defendant judgment as a matter
of law. In this regard, the district court ruled that plaintiffs "had
effectively waived their claims under 'old' [Section] 1981, since after they
amended their complaint, they failed to allege and prove that the
promotions at issue involved new and distinct
12 relationships."'
Plaintiffs then appealed the district court's ruling.
On appeal, plaintiffs "argue[d] that the district court committed
several errors in setting aside the jury's verdict and in [issuing] its final
judgment."4 18 Specifically they contended that the district court erred
by treating the jury as advisory under Rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure because they had a right to a jury trial for their Section
1981 claims.414 Finally, plaintiffs challenged the district "court's
decision to grant [the defendant-employer's] judgment as a matter of law
on their [Section] 1981 claims[,] argu[ing] that the court should have
granted them a new trial so that a jury could determine whether the
disputed promotions involved new and distinct relationships as required
under 'old' [Section] 1981." 15
After analyzing the issues, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with plaintiffs
that Rule 39(c) plainly did not apply to their Section 1981 claims that
were triable by jury as a matter of right.418 The court expressly stated
that "[it is axiomatic in such cases that a trial court cannot disregard
a jury's verdict and substitute its own findings in deciding claims;
otherwise, the court could effectively subsume the jury's finction and
408. Id.
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deprive litigants of their right to trial by jury."' 17 Thus, the court
noted that the district court's action in attempting to salvage the jury's
verdict by setting it aside and treating it as advisory was insufficient to
protect plaintiff's right to a jury trial on their Section 1981 claims."
Plaintiffs contended that the district "court should have granted them
a new trial and allowed a properly instructed jury to decide if the
promotions at issue involved new and distinct relationships," rather than
granting defendant "judgment as a matter of law based on its findings
that [plaintiff's] had waited 'too late' to raise claims under 'old' [Section]
1981."4 ' The court agreed on this issue as well, reasoning that
plaintiffs should not have been expected by the district court "to tailor
their [Section] 1981 claims to be consistent with both pre-1991 law and
the 1991 Act once the trial court held that the 1991 Act applied to their
claims and allowed them to amend their complaint accordingly.' °
Thus, the existence of a new and distinct relationship was the only
element of plaintiffs' causes of action omitted from the instructions the
jury received.4 ' The court held that because a "properly instructed
jury arguably could find for [plaintiffs], the proper remedy in this case
was a new trial, not judgment as a matter of law for [defendant].' 2
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's denial
of plaintiff's request for a new trial as to plaintiffs' Section 1981 claims
was an abuse of discretion, and reversed and remanded for a new trial
on the applicable claims.4"
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